Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) is the main implementer of external EU non-proliferation assistance projects and acts as the single contact point for stakeholders both inside and outside the EU. DG DEVCO exclusively manages budgets for nuclear non-proliferation assistance under the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) (Grip May 2011: 9-10). Within all these frameworks, the Commission has accumulated know-how and technical skills to both formulate and implement policy. It has also developed structures, budgets and working methods which are now being used in cooperation with third countries. There should no longer be any doubt of the EU's 'presence' as a provider of nuclear non-proliferation assistance. Questions remain however whether these contributions have any added value beyond the assistance EU member states are providing. The rest of this chapter discusses the output, outcomes and impact of EU assistance after 2003.
Introduction
The EU have financed and implemented assistance and cooperation projects in the field of non-proliferation of WMD in countries and organisations outside of the Union for decades.
Since 2003, EU projects in this field are specifically designed to meet the agreed objects on non-proliferation set out in the EU strategy against proliferation of WMD. (Council of the EU 2003d) This chapter discusses the value of these measures in terms of EU performance: agreed objectives ('output'), level of implementation ('outcome') and result of actions ('impact').
Some might still question whether the EU has any capacity to act in non-proliferation independent of its member states. In the field of technical assistance, the EU has developed separate capacities over several decades. In 1981, the EURATOM and the IAEA established a cooperative support programme aimed at providing EU assistance to IAEA's activities in the This is a straightforward first output in terms of clarity of formulation. The EU set out to increase funding to multilateral regimes, especially those which have verification mechanisms in place. Yet, the output is flexible enough to be inclusive of new instruments in the future. The clarity of the statement can be compared to the EU's policy in countering biological weapons, which included reinforcing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention through 'continuing the reflection on verification instruments' (Council of the EU 2003d: 10) . The EU's approach seems sensible and could play a significant role. The international regimes' abilities to initiate projects often depend on voluntary contributions and the organisations frequently ask for budget increases to carry out their mandates (Gerami 2011:6) . Added support by the EU-beyond the obligatory national contributions by EU member states-ought to be welcomed by other members of the regimes and the organisations themselves, although reservation by some stakeholders on enlarged EU contributions cannot be ruled out. The output, however, contained some possible loopholes. The agreed objective did not include an estimate of the cost. There was no decision to dedicate a set amount of money or regarding the frequency of payments. Further, there was no indication of what budget would be used. These ambiguities suggest that implementation of the output might be problematic.
Assistance to Third Countries
At the other end of the policy continuum of effective multilateralism, technical cooperation and financial assistance to third countries are often aimed at increasing third states' abilities to implement their multilateral obligations. The WMD Strategy contained three agreed objectives in terms assistance. First, the strategy aimed at 'reinforcing EU co-operative threat reduction programmes with other countries, targeted at support for disarmament, control and security of sensitive materials, facilities and expertise' (Council of the EU 2003d: 12) . The WMD Strategy further broadened the commitment to bilateral assistance:
In order to tackle and limit the proliferation risk resulting from weaknesses in the administrative or institutional organisation of some countries, the EU should encourage them to be partners in the fight against proliferation, by offering a programme aimed at assisting these countries in improving their procedures, including the enactment and enforcement of implementing penal legislation (Council of the EU 2003d: 8) .
The WMD Strategy also specified the EU objective to strengthen export control policies and practices both inside the multilateral control regimes as well as 'advocating, where applicable, adherence to effective export control criteria by countries outside the existing regimes and arrangements', specifically through 'Setting up a programme of assistance to States in need of technical knowledge in the field of export control' (Council of the EU 2003d: 11) .
In terms of output performance, the clarity of the objectives and policy means were fairly explicit, including through the specification of technical and legal assistance to states with limited capacities to meet existing standards in areas such as export control. The first statement identified that the EU's support to threat reduction programmes would move beyond the previous focus on Russia and its nuclear expertise. The second and third statements explained EU's ambition to start new programmes for assistance. In spite of a high level of clarity, significant questions of 'assistance to who' and 'how' remained unresolved.
On the other hand, the relevance of the output was strong. National capacity gaps to implement commitments are well known and several instruments ask 'able' states and regional organisations to assist other parties under for example UN resolutions. One potential drawback was the fact that the future beneficiaries of EU assistance were not clearly identified. At first sight, the output may seem perfectly inclusive, open to states both inside and outside of regimes. The objective was to offer positive incentives in order to create alliances in non-proliferation. A closer reading however, reveals that EU viewed technical capacity building as the way to 'advocate adherence' also among states outside of regimes, neglecting the political motivations some states have for choosing to remain outside of nuclear non-proliferation regimes. In order to ensure relevance to all stakeholders, the EU could have emphasized mutual cooperation rather than assistance.
The EU WMD Non--Proliferation Clause
To complement its assistance measures, the Council adopted a WMD non-proliferation clause as policy to mainstream non-proliferation into the EU's wider relations with third countries in November 2003, one month prior to the adoption of the WMD Strategy. The aim was to include in all agreements between the EU and a third country that include a CFSP component a legally binding commitment by the third country to the multilateral non-proliferation instruments (Council 2003b) . The background to the clause was the negotiations with Iran in the early 2000s for a Trade and Co-operation Agreement, which included similar conditions (House of Lords 2003). The idea was to mainstream non-proliferation into EU CFSP, to draw on EU's economic power to push its non-proliferation objectives, and to complement its provisions of positive incentives (assistance and EU enlargement) with a negative incentive (the threat of reduced bilateral trade and cooperation with the EU). The clause runs in the tradition of 'conditionality' on the part of the EU as it is designed to induce better behaviour from partner countries vis-à-vis a given issue (in this case non-proliferation) (Rynning 2007: 279) .
The clause consisted of three elements:
• full compliance with and national implementation of their existing obligations under international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements and other relevant international obligations (mandatory)
• taking steps to sign, ratify, or accede to, as appropriate, and fully implement all other relevant international instruments; (considered on a case by case basis)
• and establish an effective system of national export controls (considered on a case by case
basis)
No directions were given on what the criteria would be to consider making the second half of the clause essential to the agreement. Criteria was also lacking for what would constitute sufficient implementation. Although political conditions on issues of national security is likely to be met with protests, the meaningfulness of the clause could be strong within the EU if it would be used to raise the profile of non-proliferation commitments vis-à-vis other interests. 
Outcomes
The previous section showed good performance by the EU in terms of 'output', i.e. the adoption of policy and the identification of means by which to implement the agreed objectives. This section moves forward to analyze the outcomes of the intensions. As outlined in the first chapter of this volume, 'The emphasis of the outcome perspective is on the EU efforts and actions and whether they carry out the agreed outputs and not on their impact.'
(Blavoukos 2014, forthcoming)
Funding to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regimes
As noted in the previous section, the objective of the EU was to enhance the support to 2013) . Like many national contributions, the EU support has been earmarked to specific projects and beneficiaries. This causes a degree of inflexibility for the organisations and risks unbalancing the issue areas and countries involved in cooperation. Since the WMD Strategy did not specify a quantitative target, an increase in the EU support to projects carried out by the IAEA and the CTBTO are enough to meet the agreed objective.
Although actual increases in the EU financial support is difficult to determine exactly (due to the various budget streams used to the IAEA) the EU institutions' grant to the IAEA is today Novel to the INSC was that it was global in its scope of funding. This gave EU external assistance the option of moving away from an exclusive focus on the former Soviet Union to areas of emerging concern, such as countries with new nuclear power ambitions or regions with assessed proliferation risks due to, for example, terrorism (DG DEVCO 2013) .
In comparison with the TACIS nuclear safety programme, which had four beneficiary countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine), the INSC has, since its creation in 2007, involved 15 countries including in the Middle East and Central Asia. Nuclear safety cooperation has further expanded to countries in Latin America and South East Asia (EEAS 2013) . Although the development was in line with the objective to reinforce threat reduction measures outside of the EU, most projects of the INSC budget has been allocated to nuclear safety, rather than nuclear security, activities. The non-proliferation value of the expanded programme is therefore questionable. In general it can be said that whereas nuclear safety is about securing humans from nuclear materials, nuclear security is about protecting the material from humans. However, some view nuclear safety as a non-proliferation instrument.
Roland Kobia has argued that:
There are very tight links between safeguards and safety and between safety and security in general. The absence of expertise, of skilled workforce, of a relevant legal framework and of a sufficient safety culture in most of the countries that envisage embracing nuclear power will not only increase safety and security risks, but will also increase the burden on countries that will have to provide material equipment and technology. This will, in turn, lead to a rise in safety and radiological risks (Kobia 2008: 44) .
In terms of the second output-to offer administrative, institutional and legislative assistance to third countries on non-proliferation-a key outcome for the EU was the creation of a dedicated budget line to fund EU assistance to CBRN risk mitigation outside of the Union. 
Impact on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regimes
One way in which the EU WMD Strategy measures effective multilateralism is the universality of selected multilateral non-proliferation instruments. The EU sees increased participation in these selected instruments as an objective, and the higher the rate of participation in a certain regime, the stronger the degree of confidence in the normative effect is believed to be. It would be unreasonable to point to the Council Decisions alone to explain the sharp increase of signatory and ratifying states to these key non-proliferation instruments during this seven years period of time as this would ignore other significant developments in the area of multilateral non-proliferation. Furthermore, alongside EU efforts, state actors-including EU member states-have also been working for universalization through outreach to non-parties to the instruments. Furthermore, the EU has other instruments at its disposal to realise the objective of enhancing participation in multilateral instruments, such as the non-proliferation clause.
The CTBT has not entered into force and does not seem likely to do so anytime soon.
In such method is that the EU has provided support which has strengthened the two organisations' capacities (technical and financial) to carry out verification.
Impact of Bilateral Assistance
In terms of reinforcing EU support to threat reduction, the main contribution by the EU has The Commission ordered an assessment of the centres following the termination of TACIS.
The Commission's external consultants found that the centres constituted 'an exceptional asset' for the EU and, with some modifications to changing security challenges, 'should be preserved and used to deal with Russia and other CIS countries' (Richard et al 2009: 22) .
Other assessments, while underlining the valuable contribution that the centres made in the past, have been more critical and have questioned the programmes' value to non-proliferation going forward (Boureston and Nikitin 2005) . Assessments by donors notwithstanding, Russia has decided to withdraw from the ISTC as it considers that the initial goal of the centre has been met. Russia no longer believes that external assistance is needed to manage the threat of knowledge proliferation. The European Commission plans to make use of the lessons learn from the STCU and ISTC support to extend EU activities on WMD expertise redirection to other regions, where the communities of concern are smaller and less highly qualified than in the former Soviet Union, such as Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Syria. So far, one project to assist Iraq with the redirection of scientists and engineers by engaging them in decommissioning, dismantling and decontamination of nuclear facilities has been approved (€2.5 million) (Commission 2009: 29-30) .
In terms of the second output of the EU, to offer administrative, institutional and legislative assistance, the impact is equally difficult to measure. Foremost because of the nature of the output is quite broad and diffuse, but also because the EU has not made use of a single policy instrument through which offers of assistance were made. Via the support to IAEA, the EU has provided legislative and regulatory assistance to at least 44 states to improve their implementation of national obligations under IAEA Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocols (Council of the EU 2005:12) . Administrative and institutional assistance has been provided through the IfS, including by the creation of Knowledge Management Systems and regional CoE. Although the practical impact of these programmes is yet to be determined, they offer methodologies for managing nuclear threats and risks at the national and regional levels. The CoE also seek to establish institutional structures to address CBRN risks, including by creating and staffing regional secretariats and establish national focal points in regions which have been identified of concern to EU security. Administrative, institutional and legislative assistance has also been offered in the framework of export 
Impact of the WMD Non-Proliferation Clause
The impact of the WMD non-proliferation clause on states' behaviour is perhaps most difficult to measure. Although a study showed positive steps taken by the ACP group of states in the years following the insertion of the WMD non-proliferation clause, the same group of states also simultaneously benefitted directly from EU bilateral assistance (Grip 2009 ). The EU has not been able to adopt new political agreements with states of proliferation concern since the adoption of the clause, and therefore its impact in these cases cannot be measured.
One 
Conclusions
In terms of nuclear non-proliferation assistance, EU funding has produced some tangible Could EU member states have delivered the same level of assistance had the institutions not committed resources and established legal frameworks to carry out assistance in nuclear nonproliferation? On the financial aspect, it seems unlikely that EU member states would have allocated one additional billion Euro to the G8 global partnership between them, had the Commission's budget not been made available for this purpose. It is further difficult to see that one or several EU member states would create multiple regional CoE to address CBRN threats. In the area of export control, much assistance has been offered to EU candidate countries. Even though the key implementing agent has been the German agency BAFA, rather than the European Commission, there might be an added value to offer assistance to EU candidate countries through the EU institutions rather than by individual member states.
By conclusion, it can be said that the performance of the EU institutions on nuclear non-proliferation assistance has been relatively strong and has complemented assistance offered by EU member states.
The EU non-proliferation clause has been successfully adopted into a number of agreements, however the policy has failed to deliver in all cases of proliferation concern. One key issue is that the clause need to be inserted into a mixed agreement agreed after 2003, and the EU is not going to continue negotiations for cooperative agreement with many states of proliferation concern, due to for example sanctions. The use of the clause as 'conditionality' has therefore failed, however the adoption of the clause into agreements with likeminded states may still hold some potential as it creates the legal basis for cooperation on these issues.
Although policies will be tailored to specific countries also in the future, a methodology should be developed for cases when an EU partner refuses to include the clause, as well as follow-up procedures to check partners' observance of the clause after its insertion in EU agreements. For the EU to deliver the 'comprehensive approach' it has set out for itself, insertion of the WMD non-proliferation into agreements should be followed up with practical assistance or cooperation programmes with the contractual partner state.
